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Abstract
At any moment a student may decide to leave school and enter the la-
bor market, or stay in the education system. The time of departure from
school determines their level of academic achievement and formal qualiﬁ-
cation. Therefore, the major purpose of this paper is to derive a timing
rule for leaving school and thus answer the question: How long should I
go to school? To solve this problem we apply the real option approach.
Real option theory oﬀe r sad i ﬀerent perspective of the human capital in-
vestment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility. As future income
is uncertain, we model future earnings as a continuous stochastic process.
We use dynamic programming techniques to derive an income threshold
at which a student should leave school irreversibly, and we determine the
expected optimal duration of education. Unlike other approaches using
real option theory we are able to provide a full analytical discussion of
various determinants aﬀecting the timing of the decision to start work.
Among other things, we ﬁnd that a rising income risk increases the du-
ration of education. With a faster growth of expected individual income
during working life the duration of schooling will decrease leading to less
education. An increase in the no-education wage level will reduce hu-
man capital investments. Rising marginal rewards for a year of schooling
( i nt e r m so far i s i n gd i ﬀerential in income level) will encourage more in-
vestment in human capital. Increasing education costs may also increase
human capital investment as long as the marginal reward for a year of
s c h o o l i n gi ss u ﬃciently high. However, allowing for discontinuities due to
various cost and income proﬁles of formal qualiﬁcation levels, high costs
of schooling may lead to an achievable maximum net wealth of human
capital even for lower qualiﬁcation.
JEL classiﬁcations: J24, I2, D8
keywords: human capital theory, uncertainty,
irreversibility, optimal stopping
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Stay at school or start working?
- Optimal timing of leaving school
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uncertainty and irreversibility
Abstract: At any moment a student may decide to leave school and enter
the labor market, or stay in the education system. The time of departure from
school determines their level of academic achievement and formal qualiﬁcation.
Therefore, the major purpose of this paper is to derive a timing rule for leaving
school and thus answer the question: How long should I go to school? To solve
this problem we apply the real option approach. Real option theory oﬀers a dif-
ferent perspective of the human capital investment decision under uncertainty
and irreversibility. As future income is uncertain, we model future earnings as
a continuous stochastic process. We use dynamic programming techniques to
derive an income threshold at which a student should leave school irreversibly,
and we determine the expected optimal duration of education. Unlike other
approaches using real option theory we are able to provide a full analytical
discussion of various determinants aﬀecting the timing of the decision to start
work. Among other things, we ﬁnd that a rising income risk increases the du-
ration of education. With a faster growth of expected individual income during
working life the duration of schooling will decrease leading to less education. An
increase in the no-education wage level will reduce human capital investments.
Rising marginal rewards for a year of schooling (in terms of a rising diﬀerential
in income level) will encourage more investment in human capital. Increasing
education costs may also increase human capital investment as long as the mar-
ginal reward for a year of schooling is suﬃciently high. However, allowing for
discontinuities due to various cost and income proﬁles of formal qualiﬁcation
levels, high costs of schooling may lead to an achievable maximum net wealth
of human capital even for lower qualiﬁcation.
JEL classiﬁcations: J24, I2, D8
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Education is obtained during a long process of personal maturation and the ac-
cumulation of knowledge and abilities. Hence, formal schooling is a learning and
investment process that often lasts into one’s mid twenties. When a young per-
son makes plans for the future one of the biggest problems is uncertainty. The
success of a long education is as uncertain as the process of earning income dur-
ing a long working life. As time goes on, students repeatedly consider whether
to continue their education or enter the labor market. During this process of
decision making each moment’s conditions determine the eventual attainment
level.
Recent literature shows that real option theory can be applied to take into
account uncertain time processes and irreversibility in schooling and human
capital accumulation decisions. Hogan and Walker (2007) and Jacobs (2007)
pick up these ideas in diﬀerent ways and show that introducing real option
theory can generate new insights in the idea of education as an investment
decision in human capital.
The ﬁrst analysis of investment in human capital under uncertainty was
conducted by Levhari and Weiss (1974). Levhari and Weiss model risky future
earnings in a two-period approach of human capital formation, concluding that
an increase in uncertainty regarding the return on human capital investment de-
creases the level of investment under given assumptions about risk preferences
and risk-return technology. This paper remains a major benchmark. Later, e.g.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) extended this framework of Levhari and Weiss (1974)
to analyse tax eﬀects. Dynamic techniques combined with portfolio theory have
also gained considerable attention. Williams (1978) examines risky investment
in education using a two-period, mean-variance portfolio model. Considering
several sources of risk, Williams can derive more precise hypotheses about ob-
servable variables than Levhari and Weiss (1974). Groot and Oosterbeek (1992)
discuss the eﬀects of uncertain future earnings and the probability of unemploy-
ment on the optimal duration of schooling. Hanchane, Lioui and Touahri (2006)
develop a continuous time dynamic programming model which accounts for sev-
eral sources of uncertainty with regard to earnings and labor market conditions.
They show that the global eﬀect of uncertainty is negative, except when a suf-
ﬁciently high risk premium exists.
The application of real options theory - as established by Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) - to the human capital investment decision is a relatively recent devel-
opment. Hogan and Walker (2007) provide an example of the transfer of real
option theory to human capital theory. In their model, at any time a student
has the option to leave school to work for wages that reﬂect the years spent
in school. The decision to leave school is irreversible, so once the student has
ﬁnished education they cannot return. They conclude that high returns on ed-
ucation and increasing risk will cause students to stay in school longer. TheyStay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 2
also analyze how progressive taxation and education subsidies aﬀect schooling
decisions and show that progressive taxes tend to reduce education attainment.
Jacobs (2007) uses the real option approach as well. However, in contrast
to Hogan (2007) he uses a discrete time approach and states that the decision
to start learning is irreversible. The option value stems from the fact that
an individual could wait to enroll and would only do so once the returns are
suﬃciently large to compensate for the lost option value. The sunk cost of the
investment consists of forgone labor earnings and tuition costs.
Like Hogan and Walker (2007) we discuss how uncertain time processes
(stochastic processes) determine the duration of schooling, and - with the timing
decision to leave school - the accumulation of human capital. As education is
ac o n t i n u o u sp r o c e s s ,ay e a ro fs c h o o l i n ga l s om e a n say e a r - l o n gd e f e r r a lo ft h e
entry into the labor market. The deferral includes an option to extend schooling
for another year and to rise to a higher level of academic achievement. This
option for further education is not only a chance to obtain a better expected
income track, it also has an implicit value because the uncertainty of working life
is postponed and the irreversibility1 to leave the school system is not realized.
However, even if we are in some respect close to Hogan and Walker (2007), we
depart from their analysis in various ways. In our approach education implies
investment costs accumulate over time with additional years of schooling. These
costs may diﬀer depending on the level of formal qualiﬁcation. That is, we can
distinguish between formal qualiﬁcations and the related costs. Even more, in
addition to a pure Brownian motion, we look at the complete earning proﬁle
(the stochastic level of the income path given by the initial wage when entering
the labor market, and the stochastic dynamics of income) that is linked to
education attainment. In particular we model the stochastic marginal market
reward on initial income generated by marginal time of education. Further, not
only do we look at threshold reactions like Hogan and Walker, we also explicitly
determine the expected timing of market entry. We include stochastic changes
in the market evaluation resulting from more years of schooling or even higher
levels of formal qualiﬁcation. Explicitly determining the timing of market entry
also enables us to analytically derive how the duration of schooling responds
to all relevant variables like risk, income growth, the no-education (minimum)
wage level, costs of schooling, etc. Further, we can analyse the optimal choice
of formal qualiﬁcation as well as the optimal timing of dropping out of a formal
education program. As will be seen in the analysis, our results are widely
consistent with the empirical results recently obtained by Heckman (2008).
1There could be also a practical reversability using instruments like exit options build in
t h em o d e l .H o w e v e r ,a sw ew o u l dl i k et oa n a l y z eas i m p l ec a s ew ep o s t p o n et h i sd i s c u s s i o nt o
future research.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 3
2 A model of optimal timing to leave school
The education decision is an investment in human capital under uncertainty.
Education is a choice of various time tracks of opportunities in an uncertain
future. Investments in schooling and formal qualiﬁc a t i o n so p e nu pt h e s ev a r i -
ous time tracks of opportunities and generate the respective uncertain income
streams. How many years of life should a person invest in schooling in order
to obtain a higher academic achievement or even a higher formal qualiﬁcation?
What is the optimal duration of additional education and skill development out-
side of formal schooling programs? When is the best time to leave school and
to start working?
Modeling the optimal timing to leave the education system we can describe
the uncertain future development using various pattern of income streams de-
picted by diﬀerent stochastic processes. As soon as working life starts, the
individual will enter an uncertain labor market not knowing the income stream
and the future success of their professional activity. However, there are expec-
tations about the income track linked to the formal academic qualiﬁcation. The
expected path of a college graduate will diﬀer from that of someone with a high
school diploma.
In this model towards an optimal timing decision to leave school we suggest
real option theory in terms of a dynamic programming model. Similar to Hogan
and Walker (2007) the individual can defer their entry into the labor market and
obtain more schooling. A student maximizes their present discounted value of
lifetime earnings by deriving an optimal individual income threshold at which
it is favourable to enter the labor market. Knowing that threshold, we can
determine the expected duration of schooling and the corresponding level of
formal academic qualiﬁcation. This optimal timing decision has two elements:
1) accumulated investment costs of schooling,2 )beneﬁts of schooling with three
components: a) schooling is a determinant of the level of the earning path
depicted by the initial income when working life starts, b) schooling aﬀects the
dynamic development of the income stream and the resulting value of earnings
during working life, and c) postponing working life through longer education,
potentially achieving a better income track, or not yet being tied to a speciﬁc
uncertain earning stream has an own value, i.e. the option value of education.
While a) and b) are the components of the expected earning proﬁle, c) evaluates
the advantage of remaining ﬂexible.
At any point in time a student may decide to stay in school or to leave the
education system and start working. From the expected net earning stream
(including costs) and the option value of additional education, the student de-
termines a threshold that triggers the decision to leave school and start working.
That threshold is the initial income level a student needs to realize in order to
have a positive evaluation of the complete education project. Hence they try to
navigate their education process towards a situation in which the realized initial
market income level matches the required income suggested by the threshold.
At any moment the student compares these two values and decides whether it
is beneﬁcial to stay at school, or start working and collect the expected incomeStay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 4
linked to schooling investment. At all given moment the student reassesses their
expected further education process. As the decision is repeated we observe a
sequence of ”staying in school decisions” that adds up to the entire duration
of schooling and the eventual level of academic achievement. However, even if
not expected before, at any moment sudden (random) changes in conditions can
also lead to an unexpected start of working life resulting in an unexpected lower
level of education.
2.1 Model Components
Investment costs of schooling: If we deﬁne the time at which an individual
decides about schooling as t =0 , total schooling costs for an individual student
are the sum of the costs of each year until the end of their education.2 In this
model C is deﬁned as individual cost of a successfully completed year of schooling.
Hence, a student with low capabilities would have to spend more to successfully
complete a year of schooling. It can be assumed that these expenditures consist
of tuition, extra private lessons, purchase of books, computers, materials and
other related costs. Total investment expenditure for schooling I(T) is dynamic
and increases over time with each additional year of schooling. At time T,t h e




C(T)er(T−t)dt + ¯ C, (1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate and ¯ C are given cost to successfully
graduate, search for an adequate job and realize the market entry. To focus
on the major mechanics, in this most simple model taxes are not included.
However, this could be easily done by correcting the eﬀective interest rates r,
the costs of schooling3 and the income streams for taxes.
However, schooling not only generates costs. Three components deﬁne the
beneﬁts of schooling. a) Schooling generates a diﬀerential in the initial income
level when entering the labor market4 (move from A to B along the dotted line
in ﬁgure 1), b) schooling may lead to a change in the dynamic development and
risk of the income stream during working life (dashed line in ﬁgure 1), and c)
education time has a value of the option to wait with market entry and not to be
tied to a lifetime earning proﬁle with the corresponding risk and irreversibility.
Initial income level: The initial income when working life starts and hence
the level of income path is the ﬁrst of two elements of the earning proﬁle linked
2Recent empirical studies suggest that education costs are an important ingredient of the
education decision see e.g. Heckman (2008). By including cost of schooling we depart from
Hogan and Walker(2007) who neglect education costs.
3If schooling costs are tax deductible.
4In this respect our approach again is diﬀerent from Hogan and Walker (2007) who do not
consider this kind of reward of schooling.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 5
to the education achievement. With each additional (successful) year of school-
ing the initial income of a labor market entrant increases, and hence the level
of the earning stream rises (see the doted line in ﬁgure 1).5.H o w e v e r ,e v e ni f
another year of schooling can be expected to generate a marginal increase in
initial income by the rate δ, many random elements determine the initial in-
come when entering the labor market. For the present simple case we describe
the development of initial income levels during schooling time as a Brownian
motion6
d˜ Y = δ˜ Y + σ˜ Yd W for 0 <T<T∗. (2)
where σ denotes a constant volatility, dW denotes the increments of a stan-
dard Wiener process, and δ>0 is the expected marginal diﬀerential in income
level with respect to marginal schooling time and educational improvement (ex-
pected rate of market reward). This change in the level of the income path is
part of the total income reward generated by the schooling process. When a
student plans their education at t =0they expect from their market observa-
tion that one year of schooling will give them an initial income when entering
the market of E ˜ Y (T =1 ) . For a market entry after two years of schooling they
would expect an increase of initial income to the level E ˜ Y (T =2 ) . As we will
see later for a given dynamics of the income stream, the expected marginal mar-
ket reward δ and hence the diﬀerential in the level of the income path must be
large7 enough to compensate suﬃciently for the additional investment costs in
human capital C.
Dynamics and value of the income stream: The second element of an
individual earning proﬁle is the dynamic development of the life-earning stream.
The dynamics of an individual income track are also connected to education.
From the stylized facts we know that the dynamics of income during working
life diﬀers with respect to years of schooling and formal qualiﬁcation levels. We
assume that the lifetime earning path has systematic and random elements.
Therefore, we model the life-time earning path as a random process. Upon
entry into the market (t>T ) the student faces a stochastic revenue stream
which is characterized by an expected average growth rate α and elements of
uncertainty depicted by a constant volatility σ. In general, individual income
dynamics are driven by a stochastic earning process described by a geometric
Brownian motion
dY = αY dt + σYdW, (3)
with dW denoting the increments of a standard Wiener process. While in
the real world an earning proﬁles would not be linear and decrease at the end
5In ﬁgure 1 we consider the logarithm of income in order to draw income streams as linear
curves.
6Hogan and Walker(2007) consider only one Brownian motion for the dynamics of the
income stream. Education does not eﬀect the income proﬁle or give any marginal reward.
7In this most simple case δ is ﬁxed and the process is linear. However, a more realistic
case would be δ(T) with a non linear maybe even an s-shaped marginal reward of additional
schooling.This would imply to use more general Ito-processes to describe income development.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 6
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Figure 1: Earning proﬁle: initial income level and dynamics of income
of a working life or even become negative, we try to keep things simple and
assume α to be constant. For simplicity we also assume identical developments
no matter how many years of schooling were completed. At this point we also
do not distinguish between diﬀerent years of schooling or achievment of formal
educational levels like primary, secondary or tertiary education. Hence in ﬁgure
1 earning tracks are characterized as parallel processes. In a more realistic
setting we need to distinguish between diﬀerent earning dynamics according to
the years of schooling or academic attainment. This will be examined later in
this paper.
Once working life begins, the earning proﬁle is ﬁxed within the limits of the
random process. Hence other opportunities are excluded and the economic value
of the achieved education consists solely of its future income stream. For a risk
neutral individual the gross value of human capital (education wealth) V
gross
i is
given by the expected present value of the wage-income earning stream {Y (t)}






; r>α ,( 4 )
with r being the risk free interest rate. For simplicity the individual has an
inﬁnite lifetime.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 7
Option value of the waiting and the decision problem:
The option not to start working and not to irreversibly take the risk of em-
barking on a particular earning track has its own value - in correspondence to a
ﬁrm’s investment decision (Dixit (1989), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Wait-
ing may open up additional opportunities which could not have been foreseen
and realized otherwise. Waiting also protects individuals from an ”irreversible”
departure from the education track. Once a student has left school they cannot
return and are tied to the income and opportunity track they have chosen. In
reality this is surely not as strict as suggested by the expression ”irreversible”.8
However, the end of schooling often also marks the end of a period of a personal
life cycle characterized by a particular measure of independence and ﬂexibility.
The entry into working life marks the beginning of a new phase in life often
connected with the start of a family or responsibilities that are borne not only
to the indiviudal themselfes. A return to an education program is not impos-
sible, but often has rather high costs. Hence, leaving education is a bet that
the present education achievement pays oﬀ suﬃciently. If this bet is not suc-
cessful the student’s investment costs are lost as sunk costs. Therefore, waiting
is a value because it oﬀers the student ﬂexibility. Further, once the student has
decided to incur the sunk costs and enter the market, they could generally de-
cide to exit if realized revenues are below expectation. In the current model,
however, we assume that the student cannot exit the market voluntarily after
entering - we thus preclude the exit option and leave it for a future extension to
the present model. Accounting for the option value F for the Brownian motion
(2), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation holds:
rFdt = E(dF). (5)
This equation indicates that for a time interval dt, the total expected return on
the investment opportunity is equal to the expected rate of capital appreciation.
2.2 Decision problem
For a student the education decision is a timing problem concerning whether to
stay in school or enter the market. In order to clearly state the decision problem
for this market entry we need to determine the net value of education V (for
any education achievement) and compare this value with the option value F.
To determine the expected net value of human capital the expected gross
value (4) has to be adjusted for individual education costs I(T) accumulated
during the time of schooling (1). Hence, the net value of the earning stream of
education investment is
V = V gross − I(T) (6)
In addition to the expected net value of human capital (net wealth of educa-
tion) the third element of the decision problem, the option value of remaining
8Exit options could be included.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 8
in the education system, has to be considered. Further, as long as the student
delays market entry they retain the option of market entry without the risk of
failure and having chosen the wrong earning stream.
Given the expected net value of the earning stream (6) the option value F of
postponing market entry and obtaining a better qualiﬁcation by adding another
year of schooling can be determined by applying dynamic programming.9 Once
the option value of waiting has been determined, the question of whether or not
to wait for another period will be solved by the solution to:
max{V (T),F(T)} (7)
At any time during their education the student will compare the expected net
value of human capital with the option value of remaining at school and not
realizing an uncertain earning stream by starting work. As long as the option
value of postponing the switch into working life and continuing one’s education
is higher than the value of realizing the uncertain income stream, the student
will opt for another year of schooling. Solving this continuous decision problem
d e t e r m i n e st h et i m eo fe n t r yi n t ot h el a b o rm a r k e ta n dh e n c et h eo p t i m a ld u r a -
tion of schooling including the decision about the level of formal qualiﬁcation.
2.3 Solving for the optimal time to leave school
Solving for the optimal time of market entry as described above has two steps.
First, for each duration of schooling we need to determine the income value
(Y ∗(T) threshold) that would be needed to start working after a certain dura-
tion of schooling. This threshold is the required initial income and hence the
required level of the income path that would make one’s education proﬁtable.
When the threshold is reached, the value of the earning stream becomes higher
than the option value and hence market entry becomes more proﬁtable than
waiting and obtaining more education. Second, as the threshold would trigger
the start of working life the student simultaneously observes the development of
the relevant initial income level ˜ Y (T). The student compares the threshold for
their academic achievement with the corresponding current initial income and
veriﬁes if the threshold has already been reached. Third, if they decide to stay
at school they will make a prediction about the expected timing to leave school
and hence the expected duration of schooling. We will model these aspects in
the following section.
Determining the Entry Threshold:
In order to determine the income value that triggers the switch we need to
consider the standard conditions concerning a stochastic dynamic programming
problem. In addition to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the option
value F and applying Ito’s lemma to dF we have to use the well known boundary
9See the next section.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 9
conditions, namely (8),t h evalue matching condition (9),a n dsmooth pasting
condition (10)
Fτ (0) = 0, (8)




d(V gross(Y ∗) − I(T))
dY
smooth pasting condition. (10)
to solve for the threshold income Y ∗. The setting of the decision problem
implies that the value of the uncertain earning stream must be worth the switch
from school to work. Hence, the wage level given by the Brownian motion must
be high enough. Reaching this threshold triggers the change in strategy from
more education towards entering the labor market. Therefore, determining this
optimal threshold is the ﬁrst part of a solution to the optimal expected timing
of market entry problem.
Proposition 1 a) For a constant accumulation of costs per year of successful
schooling (1), a sequence of increasing earning levels through schooling described
by (2), and an earning dynamics after market entry following (3) we can de-


































Proof. For a proof see Appendix 1.
Since each additional year of schooling adds to the total costs of education
these costs are dynamic. The investment costs increase with years of schooling.
Therefore, the threshold changes with the duration of schooling T, i.e. the
threshold is a continuous function of T.
From the threshold function Y ∗(T) in Figure 2 we can see that an addi-
tional year of schooling drives up the threshold, that is, the student wants to
be compensated for the additional year and costs by a higher initial level of
income when entering the labor market. In other words, the student would only
complete an addtional year if they expect to be compensated by the market.
Determining the Path of Expected Initial Income Level:
Once the student knows from the threshold at which initial income level they
should start working, when can they expect to obtain this income from the
market?
As described above, the path of the initial income level is another random
process. For a year of schooling and the investment costs C the student mayStay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 10
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Figure 2: Threshold and income level
expect not only a diﬀerent earnings dynamic during working life (described
by (3)). The ﬁrst income when entering the labor market is also expected to
increase systematically by the rate δ in (2) when time of schooling T increases.
As decribed in ﬁgure 1 both income dynamics and the initial level deﬁne the
complete earning proﬁle. That is, whenever a student considers their education
attainment they have expectations about the time path of the initial income
level. Hence, the expected initial income level curve ˜ Y (T) can be also drawn in
in ﬁgure 2.10
Proposition 2 a) From the Brownian motion (3) we can derive the path of
initial income levels ˜ Y (T)=˜ Y (0)e((δ− 1
2σ2)T+σW(T)), and hence determine the
expected value of initial income for each duration of schooling T.
E ˜ Y (T)=˜ Y (0)eδT. (14)
Proof. For a proof see Appendix 2.
Expected optimal time to leave school:
The expected time of market entry can now be determined by comparing
the current expected initial income level with the the threshold in ﬁgure 2a.
Correspondingly, as long as the threshold has not been reached the option value
10More precisely, the log of the earning ˜ Yi(T). See also appendix 2.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 11
is larger than the net present value of current human capital (2b)11. Schooling
is expected to terminate when the expected initial income level reaches the
threshold.
Proposition 3 a) With the threshold Y ∗(T) ( s e e( 1 1 ) ) ,t h ee x p e c t e dd e v e l -
opment of the initial income level E ˜ Y (T) (see (2)), and condition (16) and
(17) there exist an the expected optimal time to leave school and start working
life T∗ = E(T) > 0. b) For each vector (α,r,σ,T∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C) that fulﬁls
a) there is a marginal environment, such that T∗ is an implicit function of
α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C and r.
T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ r) (15)
λ
λ − 1
(r − α) ¯ C>˜ Y (0), (16)
¯ Cr > ¯ Cδ > C0) (17)
Proof. For a proof see Appendix 3.
In ﬁgure 2, a higher threshold compared to the expected initial income level
reﬂects that learning costs during the education attainment phase (before T∗)
are not yet suﬃciently compensated by the present initial earning level. Hence
the student will not yet enter the market. Even more, conditions (16) is impor-
tant to understanding the logic of the decison problem.12 1. The decision for
any education will only be positive if the minimum wage (no-education income
˜ Y (0))i ss u ﬃciently small compared to education costs (16).13
Further, as randomness is part of reality and random elements are modeled
by a random process, the expected time of market entry (T∗) is just an indi-
cator of what may actually happen in future. As the future is partly random,
an unexpected departure from the education process for the labor market and
market entry can easily happen at any time. In ﬁgure 2 we draw the time path
of the expected initial income for the present state of information at time t0 by
˜ Y (T). A moment later, even if the individual expects to enter the market at T ∗,
a randomly occurring incident in the labor market (e.g a business cycle boom)
can push initial earnings such that the threshold is reached and the student
decides to start working immediately. In ﬁg u r e2t h i si sd i s p l a y e db yt h er a n -
domly upward shift of the realized market value at point A0. The observed and
hence realized market earnings exceeds the threshold at t1 and hence education
is terminated at T =1and not - as expected before - at T∗.I ti se a s yt oﬁnd
11As in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) page160 the curves F,V-I have an upward slope. However,
under certain conditions they can also decrease because in t his model costs are accumulated.
For details see Appendix/Annotation 3.
12Both conditions are required for the existence of a solution of the problem.
13This condition is needed for the threshold curve in ﬁgure 2 to start above the initial
income level curve.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 12
illustrative examples, like an unexpected oﬀer of an extraordinarily well-paid
job. In this model the student will take this randomly occurring opportunity at
T =1- no matter what they planned and expected before.
These simple examples also clearly illustrate that education decisions are
timing decisions. Leaving education means taking the opportunity to realize the
returns to education at the right time, even if the opportunity occurs acciden-
tally.
2.4 Determinants of the expected time of leaving school
In the previous chapter we determined the optimal expected timing of learning
and discussed the implications for academic attainment. In particular we were
able to show that the dynamic structure of the problem with special regard
to risk and irreversibility is an important ingredient of the decision problem.
In this section we examine the most important and most frequently discussed
determinants of the expected optimal duration of schooling. In particular we
look at the eﬀects of risk, income dynamics, non-education wage level, costs
of schooling and the eﬀect of changes in the marginal initial income reward of
schooling and interest rate changes.
Eﬀect of income uncertainty (σ):

























Proof. For a proof see Appendix 4.
The eﬀect of rising risk - measured by the volatility of revenues - on the time
of market entry can be expected and is consistent with Hogan and Walker (2007),
but deviates from the results of Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) and Hanchane et
al.(2006). An increasing risk of income will devalue the earning stream and hence
will require higher compensation reﬂected by an increased threshold. As long
as additional net rewards of longer education can compensate for the increase
in the threshold schooling will be continued. In ﬁgure 3a the increasing risk
will shift the threshold curve upwards, and hence makes a later market entry
more attractive. Interestingly enough, this result is obtained even if we have no
explicit evaluation of risk by a utility function (and hence implicitly risk neutral
agents). We do not need to make any assumption about the utility function and
risk aversion. The pure option value and the irreversibility includes the eﬀects
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Figure 3: Changes in costs, earning dynamics and risk
Eﬀects of income growth (α)
Proposition 5 With an increase in the growth rate of the future earnings, the




















Proof. For a proof see Appendix 5.
Declining general income growth aﬀects the beneﬁts of education. A lower
earnings growth will decrease the expected present value of schooling. Lower
growth and hence a less attractive dynamics of the earning track will only pay
oﬀ if the level of initial earnings increases. This shifts the threshold curve in
ﬁgure 3a upwards. With a suﬃcient marginal reward δ the required threshold
can still be reached after more years of schooling. This new earning proﬁle,
characterized by a higher initial level of earnings to compensate for a less rapid
income growth, still justiﬁes an even longer education.
Eﬀects of an increasing α can also be described by another intuitively plausible
story. If α increases, the expected net value of human capital would increase
as well. As it is now easier to obtain the same value with lower investments,
investments can be reduced.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 14
Eﬀects of the non-education (minimum) wage level (˜ Y (0))
Proposition 6 A rising level of the non-education (minimum) wage level ˜ Y (0)











Proof. For a proof see Appendix 6.
The minimum wage level ˜ Y (0) represents the no education wage level when
the schooling decision is made at t =0 . If the agent did not obtain any schooling
they could start working with this initial wage ˜ Y (0) (ﬁgure 3b). In case of an
increasing no education wage level educational attainment will decrease. This
ﬁnding is intuitively expected. A rise of ˜ Y (0) indicates (all else being equal)
that no education achieves a higher level in income. The higher the no education
wage path the less attractive a long education, and the more attractive a quick
market entry.
Costs of schooling (C)
Proposition 7 With increasing education costs the expected duration of school-


















Proof. For a proof see Appendix 7.
As C denotes the ﬂow of investment costs for schooling, the reaction dT ∗
dC >
0 is not the intuitively expected reaction. In the standard approach higher
investment expenditure would increase the opportunity costs of education and
hence would make education less proﬁtable. As a result educational attainment
would be reduced. Therefore, this result can be regarded as a ”tuition paradox”.
In this approach the decision problem is diﬀerent. With increasing costs
of schooling the student needs compensation from the market to stay in the
system. Therefore, with increasing C, the required threshold shifts upwards
in ﬁgure 3a. As long as the market rewards the outcome of the additional
schooling suﬃciently (δ is suﬃciently high), both curves would still intersect at
a later time. Even if the project becomes less proﬁt a b l eo v e r a l l ,t h er e s p o n s e
to increasing costs is choosing a higher income path (starting from a higherStay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 15
initial income level) generated by even more education. In other words, the
new earning proﬁle promises a suﬃciently higher level of the earning path to
compensate for the increase in costs and justify even more education. According
to empirical results provided by Heckman et al. (2008) increasing costs could be
partially compensated by higher investment in schooling and a corresponding
rise in initial earnings. Higher costs may lead to longer education as long as the
rewards are suﬃcient.
However, this is the simplest case discussed in the proposition. The intu-
itively expected outcome of reducing education when costs increase can be also
obtained as soon as the non-linear expansion of the threshold does not allow
for an intersection. If a non-linear threshold is pushed upward as drawn by the
dashed line in ﬁgure 3a increasing schooling costs cause the student to leave the
education system. The shift in the threshold cannot be matched by a suﬃcient
market reward and we ﬁnd no intersect. For the individual conditions (costs
etc.) of this student, there is no inner solution of the timing problem - the
student will leave school as soon as possible. This is the simplest solution to
the ”tuition paradox”.
Eﬀects of marginal initial earning rewards of schooling δ:
Proposition 8 An increase in the marginal initial earning reward for a year
of schooling is generally ambiguous. However, an increase in δ will tend to
postpone T∗. It encourages more education if
˜ Y (0)
C becomes suﬃciently large






















Proof. For a proof see Appendix 8.
Looking at condition (22) the sign of the reaction depends on the relative
importance of the two terms, i.e., we can identify two diﬀerent eﬀects. On the
one hand, as education generates an increasing market reward, initial earning
approaches the threshold more quickly [ﬁrst term of (22)].
On the other hand, the threshold itself will be aﬀected. Education time
generates a higher reward and hence schooling duration becomes more valueable
[second term of (22)]. Depending on these two relative eﬀects we obtain a
positive or a negative total eﬀect. In proposition (22) we suggest that costs
are relatively high compared to the earning level ˜ Y (0). Hence schooling will
be extended. Further, as the threshold is - among others - determined by the
evaluation of the education time, we can see how the real option approach aﬀects
the decision.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 16
Eﬀects of the interest rate:
Proposition 9 An increase in the interest rate is generally ambiguous. How-
ever, an increase in the interest rate will reduce/increase education (decrease/increase
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Proof. For proof see Appendix 9
As formally discussed in the appendix the reaction is generally ambiguous.
However, we can determine conditions to obtain one or the other reaction.
3 Education attainment with diﬀerent levels of
formal qualiﬁcation
The purpose of this section is to account for discontinuities and non-linearities
in the decision problem. After the general discussion of an optimal timing
decision to leave school we now extend the model to include diﬀerent levels
of formal qualiﬁcation. Wages and costs of schooling may not only increase
with years of schooling but also may jump after an attainment of a certain
education level to a higher income stream. The so-called ”sheepskin eﬀect”
seems of increasing importance in the recent empirical discussion. Although
one branch of research argues that there is a linear relationship between wages
and years of schooling, recent ﬁndings support the hypothesis of non-linearities
in incomes, which occur especially with college and high school completition.14
Further, it seems that both the years of schooling and the achieved level of
formal qualiﬁcation determine the two elements of the earning proﬁle, namely
the initial income when entering the labor market, and the dynamics of earnings
during working life. Therefore, considering years of schooling and completion
of diﬀerent levels of formal qualiﬁcation simultaneously is the natural next step
in extending the model.
In this extension optimal timing is a choice of a sequence of investments
with varying earning proﬁles connected with the completion of diﬀerent levels
of formal qualiﬁcation. In general the above model can be regarded as a model
for only one level of formal qualiﬁcation. In order to consider more levels we
simply symmetrically add other earning proﬁles to decide on the full set of
opportunities. Speciﬁcally, for each level of formal qualiﬁcation i (e.g. secondary
14see Heckman (1995); Denny, Harmon (2001); Skalli, A (2007); Ferrer, Ana (2008); Silles,
Mary (2008).Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 17
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Figure 4: Changes in the minimum wage level and the initial earning rewards
of schooling
education) we assume speciﬁcc o s t sCi for a successful year of schooling, and
we expect a speciﬁc earning proﬁle connected to this formal qualiﬁcation level.
Again, a student observes that for each formal qualiﬁcation level i ay e a ro f
additional schooling will increase their initial income level ˜ Yi a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
Brownian motion15
d˜ Yi = δi ˜ Yi + σi˜ YidW for t<T i.
where Ti denotes the years of schooling required to complete the formal
qualiﬁcation level i (e.g in many secondary education programs students have
to study four years, and hence Ti =4 ). Further, the dynamic development of
income Yi during working life for each level of formal qualiﬁcation i is once
again described by16
dYi = αiYidt + σiYidW.
It now becomes apparent that the individual earning proﬁles associated with
diﬀerent levels of formal qualiﬁcation may be characterized by diﬀerent marginal
rewards in initial income level (δi), diﬀerent growth patterns (αi) and diﬀerent
risks (σi).
In ﬁgure 4 we describe an example for three levels of formal qualiﬁcation
(primary, secondary and tertiary education, i =1 ,2,3) to illustrate the addi-
tional eﬀects of completing of various qualiﬁcation levels. Figure 4 describes
15Each level of formal qualiﬁcation is modeled symmetrically to the reference model above.
Therefore see also (2) for only one level of formal qualiﬁcation.
16see again (3).Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 18
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Figure 5: Menue of choices with high education costs
various proﬁles for various years of schooling and levels of formal qualiﬁcation.
When a speciﬁcn u m b e ro fy e a r sTi is reached the student attains a formal qual-
iﬁcation i (e.g. secondary education). In this diagram for higher level of formal
qualiﬁcation we assume a smaller δi and an larger αi.A s a r e s u l t , s t u d e n t s
studying at e.g. secondary level are rewarded for additional schooling with rel-
atively strong boost in initial wages, but will also expect relatively low income
dynamics. However, other patterns of income proﬁles are possible.
As in the previous chapter we can now take the initial income curve ˜ Yi(T),
determine the threshold curve Y ∗
i (T)17 and derive the optimal time of schooling
for each level of qualifcation T∗
i . For our example involving three levels of formal
qualiﬁcation ﬁgure 5a gives the results in the V,F − T-plane. When education
starts, a student will make a decision concerning the anticipated duration of
schooling and the corresponding formal academic qualiﬁcation. Their plan uses
available information and takes into account potential irreversibility.
Figure 5a exhibits three proﬁles of net value of human capital (net wealth of
education) Vi (i =1 ,2,3 see (6)) and the corresponding option value, one for
each level of formal qualiﬁcation. At each moment students will compare the net
value of human capital when starting to work now Vi(T),w i t ht h evalue of the
option of staying in school and obtaining more education Fi(T) (see (7))A sl o n g
17To keep the discussion simple, we do not explicitly consider the option value of a total
sequence, such that the completion of one level education is required to start the next education
phase. This extension would increase the option value.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 19
as the option value is higher than the net value of human capital the student
will defer their decision to enter the labor market. Waiting and completing
more years of schooling is the dominant strategy. In ﬁgure 5a we can follow
this consideration from the start. If V1 <F 1 the student will defer entering
the labor market. They will do so until point A is reached. At point A the
value matching condition (9) and smooth pasting condition (10) simultaneously
hold and an optimum has been reached. If there are no other alternatives, A
would be the optimal duration of schooling at primary level. However, there
are alternatives. The student could ﬁnish primary education and then opt for
additional schooling at secondary level. As the value of a completed primary
education and some secondary-level schooling (F2) is higher than V1 at point A
the student will complete primary education and enter secondary education. For
this higher, secondary education level they go through the same considerations
as before. Comparing the value of entering the labor market with the option
values of additional education and the attendant opportunities, they will opt for
additional years of schooling in the example of ﬁgure 5a. The expected optimal
time of schooling T∗ is reached at the formal qualiﬁcation of tertiary education
plus some additional schooling time. Since for each formal qualiﬁcation the
optimal timing to leave school and entering the labor market can be determined,
it is easy to pick the optimal point according to the decision rule. G is the stable
optimal solution of this dynamic decision problem which includes irreversibility
and uncertainties.
Moreover, as completing formal qualiﬁcation i =3(tertiary education) is
reached at T = Ti=3 and T∗ >T i=3 t h es t u d e n td e c i d e st oh a v em o r ey e a r s
of schooling than the minimum years required to complete tertiary education.
If θ = T∗ − Ti > 0 are the additional years of schooling beyond the minimum
formal requirement, why these extra years of education? In real life we ﬁnd
many education activities which are not directly connected to a formal qualiﬁ-
cation. Internships, a language course in a language school abroad, time spent
on searching for a job and collecting information and even time spent on devel-
oping ones personal proﬁl ec a ne x t e n do n e ’ sd u r a t i o no fe d u c a t i o nb e y o n dt h e
minimum required duration for a given formal qualiﬁcation. Therefore, these
additional years are part of the value of the waiting option after formal edu-
cation has been attained. The additional years θ do not necessarily take place
after a formal education has been reached; they can, and in fact normally do,
take place at any time during the formal education program.
We can also think of other examples especially at tertiary level when an extra
year may be completed during the oﬃcial term of study. At universities many
students take a sabbatical from their home program. In this case the extra year
is taken before formal graduation. The extra year will extend the time until the
formal qualiﬁcation is completed. In this case working life still starts right after
graduation, which seems to be the normal pattern. Therefore, equation (15)
is the number of school years including those elements that are not formally
required for formal qualiﬁcation at secondary level.
Further, to have a reference system the NPV curve under certainty is drawnStay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 20
in ﬁgure 5b. First, under certainty, the standard problem is to pick the optimal
duration of schooling that maximizes the net present value (point D in ﬁgure
5b). Under uncertainty the optimal strategy leads to a later market entry lead-
ing to a lower net present value than under certainty.18 Sustaining ﬂexible is
compensated by a reduction of the NPV (point G in 5b). Second, the diagram
also illustrates how a person can choose the optimal duration of schooling at the
tertiary level, even if secondary education would lead to a higher expected net
value of human capital. In order to illustrate this decision we assume high tu-
ition costs at tertiary level of qualiﬁcation. The high cost of a college education
(C3 <C
+
3 ) would shift the V3 and F3 curve downward.19 Hence, after secondary
education (T = T2), the expected optimal duration of schooling at tertiary level
is indicated by point G
+
. This is the only stable point at the tertiary level.
The optimal plan suggests that education is expected to ﬁnish at tertiary
level. Therefore, suﬃciently high education costs compared to the level of the
earnings path and the resulting eﬀects on the net value of human capital would
drive a student to extend their education, even if less education has as higher
expected net value. The dynamic decision problem suggests more education.
The expectation to start at a higher initial income level suﬃciently compen-
sates for the risk and inﬂexibility involved in being tied to a certain income
track. Hence market entry is postponed even if the expected net wealth de-
creases as a result. Heckman et al.(2008) estimate marginal internal rates of
return for several schooling levels taking into account tuition costs (consist-
ing of tuition and non-pecuniary costs), income taxes and non-linearities in
the earnings-schooling-experience relationship. The internal rate of return to
schooling is used to rate whether educational expenditure should be expanded
or contracted. The authors ﬁnd that there are relatively greater returns to grad-
uating from high school than to graduating from college. These ﬁndings seem
consistent with the results in this approach.
However, as discussed in the subsequent section (see ﬁgure 2), this menue
of choices reﬂects long term expectations regarding on years of schooling and
completing formal education, while the future is uncertain. Therefore, this
optimal plan that is valid only under the present conditions of period t =0 .
It is a preliminary optimal plan which needs to be revised permanently. One
period later the optimal plan and the marginal decision to wait or start working
is adjusted to account for new information and conditions. The sequence of
marginal decisions terminates when the decision to switch is made. Then the
earnings track has been chosen irreversibly. In other words, even if the plan
suggests that schooling should be expected to be terminated in 3 years (e.g. after
tertiary education is completed), a sudden change in conditions can terminate
schooling overnight, leading to an unexpected entry into working life.
18The diﬀerences of the outcome of optimal decisions under certainty and uncertainty using
this approach are also described for a simple example by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) chapter
5.1.
19See appendix 3d.Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 21
4 Summary
The major purpose of this paper is to derive a timing rule for leaving school and
entering the labor market. Thus, we answer the question: How long should one
go to school? Considering uncertainty of future developments we use real op-
tion theory in terms of a dynamic programming model. Schooling expenditure,
earning streams and the option values of remaining in education determine the
optimal timing of departure from school and one’s academic achievement. In
addition to the recent literature our approach includes schooling costs depending
on individual abilities and qualiﬁcation programs. Future income level rewards
for additional schooling are uncertain and described by a Brownian motion. A
second Brownian motion describes the dynamics of the income earning proﬁle
once working life has started. At all times an individual can decide to remain
in school or leave the education system and start working. However, once the
decision to leave the education system is made, it is not possible to reenter. The
decision is irreversible. As the individual knows the expected path of earning
streams and the optimal threshold, the expected optimal duration of schooling
can be identiﬁed. With the optimal duration of schooling we also determine the
optimal academic achievement and the level of formal qualiﬁcation. We solve
the model purely analytically and ﬁnd: 1) An increasing income risk increases
the duration of education. 2) With an increase in the generally expected growth
of individual income the expected time of schooling will decrease leading to less
education. 3) An increase in the no-education wage level will reduce human
capital investments. 4) A rising marginal reward for a year of schooling (in
terms of a rising diﬀerential in the income levels) will under certain conditions
favour investments in human capital. 5) Increasing education costs may also
increase human capital investments as long as the marginal reward for a year
of schooling is suﬃciently high and hence additional costs have a suﬃcient in-
come compensation. However, if we allow for discontinuities due to various cost
and income proﬁles of formal qualiﬁcation levels, very high (individual) costs of
schooling may lead to an achievable maximum net wealth of human capital at
the lower levels of formal qualiﬁcation.
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5 Appendix/Annotations (to help the referee fol-
low the calculations easily)
5.1 Annotation 1: Proof of Proposition 1 and Derivatives
of λ
The value of the revenue stream is determined by


















For the option values Fi the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the Brown-















σ2 ˜ Y 2 ∂F













σ2 ˜ Y 2 ∂F
∂ ˜ Y 2)dt
because E(dW)=0 .










σ2 ˜ Y 2 ∂F







σ2 ˜ Y 2 ∂F
∂ ˜ Y 2 − rF =0
This is a second-order homogenous ordinary diﬀerential equation with a free
boundary.










solves the homogenous diﬀerential equation.
δ˜ YBλ˜ Y λ−1 +
1
2
σ2B ˜ Y 2λ(λ − 1)˜ Y λ−2 − rB˜ Y λ =0
δBλ˜ Y λ +
1
2



















σ2 > 1 see (12)
with δ<r see (13)
As ˜ Y goes to zero, F tends to 0. This implies that the negative root of the
characteristic polynomial should have no inﬂuence on F as ˜ Y tends to zero.



































































































































































































































































































At the investment trigger point Y ∗ the value of the option must equal the
net value obtained by exercising it (value of the active project minus sunk cost
of the investment). Hence the following must hold:



























































Besides for I(T) > 0 we have to assume that ¯ C>C
r .
The smooth-pasting condition require st h a tt h et w ov a l u ef u n c t i o n sm e e t
tangentially:
(F(Y ∗))0 =( V gross(Y ∗))0
⇔ Bλ(Y ∗)λ−1 =
1
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5.2 Annotation 2: Deriving T and Proof of Proposition 2
a) Development of the initial income level value: The development of
the pre-start-up market value is determined by
d˜ Y = δ˜ Y + σ˜ Yd W
We put g(x)=l o gx to get the Ito formula for log ˜ Y (t):
















We obtain after integration










⇔ log ˜ Y (T)=l o g˜ Y (0) + (δ −
1
2
σ2)T + σW(T), and hence
˜ Y (T)=˜ Y (0)e((δ− 1
2σ2)T+σW(T)) and hence
E ˜ Y (T)=˜ Y (0)eδT.
∂E˜ Y (T)
∂T
= δ˜ Y (0)eδT
and lnE ˜ Y (T) is a linear function in T:
lnE ˜ Y (T)=l n˜ Y (0) + δT
5.3 Annotation 3: Existence of a solution for the expected
time T∗ of market entry, and determination of T∗ as
an implicit function/Proof of Proposition 3:
In general we look for conditions described in ﬁgure 6. The threshold starts
above the initial income curve. For positive T the threshold will have an unique
intersection with the initial value curve from below at A. Hence at the time
of expected market entry denoted by T∗ G = Y ∗(T) − E ˜ Y (T)=0and the
G−curve has a negative slope dG
dT < 0.
Further, at T∗ the threshold Y ∗(T =0 )must start above the expected initial
income E ˜ Y (T =0 ) , and G>0 during the pre-market entry period (0 <t<T∗).






















Figure 6: Intersection of the threshold and initial income function, and distance
function G.






− δ˜ Y (0)eδT∗
< 0 (24)
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< ¯ C ⇔ C<δ¯ C<r¯ Cs e e17
Before market entry the initial income curve must grow faster than the
threshold curve. Only for a negative slope G can approach and eventually reach
zero. ∂G
∂T < 0 is fulﬁlled if condition ¯ C>C
r (condition 17)
5.3.2 Existence of an intersect of Y ∗(T ∗) and E ˜ Y (T∗) for positive T∗
a) As the function lnY ∗(T) is convex if condition (17) holds (see 23) and the
function lnE ˜ Y (T) is linear, there are at most two intersections. We are inter-
ested only in intersections at T>0. An intersection for positive values of both
functions exsits if condition (16) and (17) holds and G =0for positive values
of T∗.
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(r−α) ˜ Y (0)
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The last inequality is a condition for the axis intercepts of Y ∗and E ˜ Y.It
guarantees that E ˜ Y has a lower value in T =0than Y ∗.







b) Further, In ﬁgure 6 the condition for an intersection and a negative slope
have to hold simultaneously at T∗. We need to show that there is a T∗ were
both dG
dT < 0 and G =0hold. That is, we can ﬁnd a minimum level for ˜ Y (0) in
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Finally, ˜ Y (0) has to lie in the open interval
µ
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5.3.3 c) T∗ as implicit function of various variables: Proof of proposi-
ton 3
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : (i) condition , (16) hold,
(ii) the derivative ∂G
∂T (α,r,σ,T∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C) is negative (see condition (24))
for each vector (α,r,σ,T ∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C) and
(iii) the partial derivatives of G by of α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C and r are continuous
(vide infra), we can apply the implicit function theorem. Hence for a marginal
environment of any vector (α,r,σ,T∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C),T ∗ is an implicit function
of of α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C and r. q.e.d.
T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ,r, ¯ C)

















































− rCerT < 0
⇔ rCerT >
δ
2 ˜ Y (0)eδT
r − α
⇔ ln(rC)+rT > ln(
δ

































5.4 Annotation 4: Proof of Proposition 4
To apply comparative statics for the implicit function T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ r)






(r − α)CerT − δ˜ Y (0)eδT T 0
Since we are only interested in values of T∗ described by point A in ﬁgure 6
conditions (16) and ∂G
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(r − α)Ce(r−δ)T − δ˜ Y (0)
| {z }
<0 see (24 and 17)
< 0































































<0 see (24 and 17)
C
> 0Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 34
5.8 Annotation 8: Proof of Proposition 8
For the derivative with respect to δ and r we need an approximation of I(T) to
examine the sign. We approximate I(T) for the time range between 0 and the
point T∗ by a log linear function with the parameter β denoting the average
growth rate of total accumulated costs between 0 and T∗. Economically this
simpliﬁcation describes a approximation where total costs are payable only at
the end of the education period. The non log linear path of cost accumulation
is proximated as a continous geometric growth process. Therefore we introduce








Note that we approximate a non-linear function (I) with a non-linear growth
rate through a log-linear function which has the same unique positive intersec-
tion with the logarithmized income threshold curve. We consider the shape of
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¢
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T=0 =l n¯ C =l nI(0).
As both curves intersect in T = T∗ we can determine a β that satisﬁes the




































As Y ∗(0) >E˜ Y (0) and ln( ¯ CeβT∗
) and lnI(T) start at the same point, the
corresponding condition for the approximation to (24) is
δ − β>0 (25)Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 35




(r − α) ¯ CeβT∗
− ˜ Y (0)eδT∗
=0




































































Similar to the derivative of T∗ with respect to r we have to examine under
which condition which summand prevails. Here we assume that the eﬀect of the
option value is dominant.













































































To ﬁnd out if X T 0 we need to follow three steps:
1) Assume a suﬃcient condition for X>0 and X<0: From our
knowledge of the system we assume a suﬃcient condition for an unambigious
sign. It is supposed that
3
8σ2 + 3
2δ>r implies X>0. (26)
3
8σ2 + 3
2δ<r implies X<0. (27)Stay at school or start working?, March 2, 2009 36
2) Show that conditon (26) and (27) hold We now show that (26) and
(27) are suﬃcient conditions to obtain an unambigious sign for X:
a) From (26) we obtain λ<3/2 and from (27) we obtain λ>3/2





































































































































we proved that the value of λ depends on
the conditions (26) and (27). Therefore we get
3
2 >λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ>2r (28)
3
2 <λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ<2r (29)

































































































































With the conditions (29) and (28) we know 3
2 >λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ>2r and
3
2 <λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ<2r . Therefore we can check if we ﬁnd true conditions
















































































































































































As we can see there is a feasible combination of δ,σ2, and α satisfying this
condition. The assumption that X>0 and X<0 is proven under the derived
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